哪位高手帮忙翻译一下英文摘要（不要在线翻译）谢谢!当今公司治理的焦点已经集中在大股东与中小股东的利益矛盾上.在我国上市公司中,由于国有股“一股独大”特殊股权结构的存在,大股

哪位高手帮忙翻译一下英文摘要（不要在线翻译）谢谢!当今公司治理的焦点已经集中在大股东与中小股东的利益矛盾上.在我国上市公司中,由于国有股“一股独大”特殊股权结构的存在,大股
哪位高手帮忙翻译一下英文摘要（不要在线翻译）谢谢!
当今公司治理的焦点已经集中在大股东与中小股东的利益矛盾上.在我国上市公司中,由于国有股“一股独大”特殊股权结构的存在,大股东对小股东的侵害行为,即“掏空”非常普遍,日益受到人们的关注.而在大股东众多的“掏空”方式中,大股东非法占用上市公司的资金又尤为严重,一系列的占款问题层出不穷.如今我国众多上市公司大股东及其关联方占款的这种“掏空”行为已经成为一个沉重、敏感的话题.大股东的这种“掏空”现象的存在己经严重扰乱了资本市场的秩序,成了资本市场制度建设的阻碍.倘若大股东“掏空“问题长期得不到解决,资本市场的正常秩序就不可能真正建立起来,制度化建设也就无从谈起.为此,大股东“掏空”问题关系到资本市场的长治久安,久拖不决必将拖累整个经济的健康发展.西方关于大股东“掏空”行为的理论与实证研究已经大量的涌现,相比国外,我国在这方面的研究尚处于初级阶段.
本文在系统回归西方学者研究上市公司大股东“掏空”行为影响因素经验文献的基础之上,结合我国具体的经济制度特点,将影响我国上市公司大股东“掏空”行为的因素分为内部治理机制和外部治理因素两大类.选取我国深沪两市2002-2007年上市公司4000个样本数据,通过单变量T检验,多元回归检验分析我国上市公司大股东“掏空”行为的影响因素.
研究结果显示,内部治理因素中：（1）控股股东为国家性质持股的与大股东“掏空”行为负相关；（2）控股股东存在方式为企业集团形式对大股东“掏空”行为并没有显著的影响；（3）股权集中度加剧了大股东的“掏空”行为,而股权制衡度则能有效的抑制大股东的“掏空”行为；（4）管理者持股比例和机构投资者持股比例均与大股东“掏空”行为负相关；（5）独立董事比例能够抑制大股东的“掏空”行为,而两职合一却对大股东的“掏空”行为没有影响.在外部治理因素中：（1）外部审计质量与大股东的“掏空”行为显著负相关；（2）产品市场的竞争激烈程度也能够显著的抑制大股东的“掏空”行为.

哪位高手帮忙翻译一下英文摘要（不要在线翻译）谢谢!当今公司治理的焦点已经集中在大股东与中小股东的利益矛盾上.在我国上市公司中,由于国有股“一股独大”特殊股权结构的存在,大股
Today,the focus of corporate governance has concentrated in the big shareholders and the interests of small and medium shareholders.In the listed companies in China,because the only big state-owned "a" special equity structure of the existing shareholders,big shareholders,namely the infringement cpas' very common,increasing attention.But in many big shareholders in the "empty",big shareholders occupy listed company funds illegally and particularly serious,a series of ZhanKuan problems emerge in endlessly.Nowadays many listed companies in China and its affiliates ZhanKuan big shareholders of the "empty" has become a heavy,sensitive topic.The "shareholders" phenomenon exists hollowed by disrupting the capital market order,became the capital market system construction.If big shareholder "empty" problem solving,not long-term capital market order will not be established,institutional construction also mentioned.Therefore,the big shareholders "empty" problems related to the capital market will drag the stability,dragged on the healthy development of the economy.The west about big shareholder "empty" theory and empirical studies of behavior has plenty of emergence,compared with foreign,our country in this research is still in the primary stage.
Based on the research of western scholars system regression listed company shareholder "empty" behavior influencing factors based on the empirical literature,in combination with the specific characteristics of economic system,and will affect the listed companies in China big shareholders' behavior factor into internal governance mechanism and external factors.Select our Shanghai 2007 listed companies during 2002-4000 sample data,through the univariate and multivariate regression testing T test analysis of China's listed companies big shareholders' behavior of influencing factors.
Research results show that the internal control factors:(1) the controlling shareholders for national property ownership and big shareholder "empty" behavior; (2) the controlling shareholder mode of existence for enterprise group of big shareholder "form of behavior,and no significant influence,(3) equity concentration aggravate the shareholders' behavior,and between degree of ownership balance can effectively restrain big shareholder "empty" behavior,(4) managers shareholding ratio and institutional investors with big shareholders' behavior; (5) the proportion of the independent directors can restrain the "empty" big shareholders,and one to two big shareholder "empty" have no effect.In the external factors:(1) the external audit quality and big shareholder "empty" significant negative correlation,(2) the market competitive products can also significantly inhibit big shareholder "empty" behavior.

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意思是： Today, the focus of corporate governance has concentrated in the big shareholders and the interests of small and medium shareholders. In the listed companies in China, because the only big ...

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意思是： Today, the focus of corporate governance has concentrated in the big shareholders and the interests of small and medium shareholders. In the listed companies in China, because the only big state-owned "a" special equity structure of the existing shareholders, big shareholders, namely the infringement cpas' very common, increasing attention. But in many big shareholders in the "empty", big shareholders occupy listed company funds illegally and particularly serious, a series of ZhanKuan problems emerge in endlessly. Nowadays many listed companies in China and its affiliates ZhanKuan big shareholders of the "empty" has become a heavy, sensitive topic. The "shareholders" phenomenon exists hollowed by disrupting the capital market order, became the capital market system construction. If big shareholder "empty" problem solving, not long-term capital market order will not be established, institutional construction also mentioned. Therefore, the big shareholders "empty" problems related to the capital market will drag the stability, dragged on the healthy development of the economy. The west about big shareholder "empty" theory and empirical studies of behavior has plenty of emergence, compared with foreign, our country in this research is still in the primary stage.
Based on the research of western scholars system regression listed company shareholder "empty" behavior influencing factors based on the empirical literature, in combination with the specific characteristics of economic system, and will affect the listed companies in China big shareholders' behavior factor into internal governance mechanism and external factors. Select our Shanghai 2007 listed companies during 2002-4000 sample data, through the univariate and multivariate regression testing T test analysis of China's listed companies big shareholders' behavior of influencing factors.
Research results show that the internal control factors: (1) the controlling shareholders for national property ownership and big shareholder "empty" behavior; (2) the controlling shareholder mode of existence for enterprise group of big shareholder "form of behavior, and no significant influence, (3) equity concentration aggravate the shareholders' behavior, and between degree of ownership balance can effectively restrain big shareholder "empty" behavior, (4) managers shareholding ratio and institutional investors with big shareholders' behavior; (5) the proportion of the independent directors can restrain the "empty" big shareholders, and one to two big shareholder "empty" have no effect. In the external factors: (1) the external audit quality and big shareholder "empty" significant negative correlation, (2) the market competitive products can also significantly inhibit big shareholder "empty" behavior.

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